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Abstract
We measure the welfare distortions from endogenous quality choice in imperfectly
competitive markets. For U.S. cable-television markets between 1997-2006, prices are
33% to 74% higher and qualities 23% to 55% higher than socially optimal. Such quality
overprovision contradicts classic results in the literature and our analysis shows that it
results from the presence of competition from high-end satellite TV providers: without
the competitive pressure from satellite companies, cable TV monopolists would instead
engage in quality degradation. For welfare, quality overprovision cable customers would
prefer smaller lower quality cable bundles at a lower price, amounting to a twofold increase
in consumer surplus for the average consumer.
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1 Introduction
Market power over price is one of the most widely understood and enduring concepts in eco-
nomics. Whereas competitive markets, under standard assumptions, ensure the maximization
of welfare, market power over price creates a wedge between the marginal social benefits and
costs of production, introducing inefficiency in the form of deadweight loss. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that market power over price is the primary focus of antitrust and competition law
and economics.1
∗We would like to thank Dan Ackerberg, Gary Biglaiser, Eugenio Miravete, and seminar participants at
Arizona, East Anglia, Harvard Business School, Helsinki, Northwestern, Mannheim, Maryland, UBC-Sauder,
UCLA, Zurich, the 2016 Asia-Pacific IO Conference, the CEPR Conference on Competition in the New Econ-
omy and the 2015 Zhejiang University IO conference for helpful comments. Crawford thanks ESRC Grant
RES-062-23-2586 for financial support for this research. Special thanks goes to Chenghuan (Sean) Chu for
providing the data used in this analysis and to Ali Yurukoglu, with whom we have had many fruitful discussions
about cable television markets.
1Examples include price-fixing, predatory pricing, and attempted monopolization, among others (Elhauge
(2011)). Similarly, the primary concern of merger review is exercise of market power over price due to unilateral
or coordinated action (DOJ and FTC (2010)).
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There is much less focus on concerns about market power over quality, or over non-price
attributes more generally.2 Just as they do with prices, firms in imperfectly competitive
industries will distort quality levels away from socially optimal levels, but unlike prices, the
direction of this distortion is not clear. Spence (1975) shows that a single-product monopolist
may offer more or less quality than a social planner in the same market. There is a consensus
view in the screening literature that cable monopolists degrade quality (Mussa and Rosen
1978, Maskin and Riley 1984). Despite this consensus, Champsaur and Rochet (1989) show
that when consumers face high-end outside options, then the incentives may reverse, resulting
in “quality overprovision” relative to the first best, making it an empirical question as to
whether market power leads to over- or under-provision of quality in real-world settings.
In this paper, we measure the welfare effects of endogenous quality choice by U.S. cable
television systems. We estimate an equilibrium demand and supply model of consumers’
choices across television bundles offered by cable and satellite TV companies. Based on the
results, we compute how much offered qualities differ from those given by a welfare-maximizing
social planner.
Importantly, we find that firms choosing both price and quality in the cable TV market
tend to set both prices and quality too high relative to first-best socially optimal levels. This
evidence for “quality overprovision” is novel compared to the classic results in the theoretical
literature discussed above. Digging deeper to examine the sources of the quality overprovision
result, we find that it is the presence of satellite TV competitors, who provide high-end
substitutes for cable TV companies’ offerings, which drive the quality overprovision result,
rather than the rich consumer preference heterogeneity that we allow for in our demand model.
Our analysis builds on and extends previous empirical research looking at related ques-
tions.3 Berry and Waldfogel (2001) and Sweeting (2010) empirically analyze the effects of
increased market power on product variety and/or quality, but do not optimally solve for
those qualities. Clerides (2002) and Verboven (2002) analyze quality-based price discrimina-
tion, but focus primarily on documenting its presence. Where the types of products a firm
can offer are discrete, the choice facing firms is whether or not to add any such product.
In this vein, Draganska et al. (2009), Eizenberg (2014), Nosko (2014), and Sweeting (2013)
recover the fixed costs of offering new products and, in some cases, endogenously solve for new
product introductions. Gandhi et al. (2008), Chu (2010), Fan (2013), and Byrne (2015) study
firms’ endogenous choices of continuous characteristics while holding the set of products fixed,
as in this paper. Finally, we contribute to the literature analyzing economic issues in pay tele-
vision markets (Goolsbee and Petrin (2004), Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Crawford et al.
(2018)).
2DOJ and FTC (2010, Chap 1) is a notable exception, stating, “Enhanced market power can also be
manifested in non-price terms and conditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced product quality,
reduced product variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation.” They go on to say, “When the Agencies
investigate whether a merger may lead to a substantial lessening of non-price competition, they employ an
approach analogous to that used to evaluate price competition,” but do not provide details.
3See Crawford (2012, Section 5) for more details about the related literature.
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The papers closest in spirit to ours are McManus (2007) and Crawford and Shum (2007).
Both find evidence of quality degradation for low-quality products along the lines predicted
by the theoretical literature above. Here, in contrast, using more flexible specification of
preferences, we find evidence of quality overprovision, even for low-quality products, which is
a novel finding in the empirical literature.
The empirical framework we propose is based closely on the empirical analysis of differen-
tiated product markets pioneered by Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995).4 On the demand
side, we specify a discrete-choice demand model with random coefficients on price and quality.
We specify a total cost function which depends on both quantity and quality. Cable systems
maximize profits by choosing optimally the price and quality of the products they choose
to offer.5 Estimation is by GMM using moments generated by demand and the first-order
conditions for prices and qualities. Demand, marginal (quantity) cost and marginal quality
cost shifters serve as instruments.6
We estimate the model on a dataset of almost 12,000 cable system years between 1997
and 2006. We also incorporate annual data on prices and qualities for satellite competitors
over the same period. U.S. cable television markets during our sample period are well-suited
for our model for three reasons. First, the products cable systems offer are bundles of tele-
vision networks with higher-quality bundles uniformly including all of the networks in lower
quality bundles (and more). Limiting an empirical analysis to a single dimension of product
quality is therefore reasonable in this setting. Second, there is interesting variation in the
competition faced by systems in the sample. In the early part of our sample, cable television
systems are largely local monopolies; while satellite competitors entered in the mid-1990s,
regulations on their ability to import local broadcast networks before 2000 limited their abil-
ity to compete with incumbent cable systems.7 Finally, our data on cable (and satellite)
markets are rich enough to accurately analyze endogenous quality. Cable systems in our data
serve geographically distinct local cable markets. Within the sample, each offers at most 3
bundles of networks. For each offered bundle, we observe the price charged, its market share,
and the television networks it offers. Following previous work in this literature (Chu (2010),
Shcherbakov (2016)), we use a weighted total number of television networks in a bundle as
our measure of quality for that bundle, with weights for each channel given by the national
4Applications using this framework are too numerous to count but include measuring the market power of
firms (Nevo (2001)), conducting simulations of potential mergers (Berry and Pakes (1993)), testing for price
discrimination (Verboven (2002)), and quantifying the welfare benefits of new goods (Petrin (2002)).
5The number of offered products depends on the technology used by cable systems and is therefore plausibly
exogenous to annual price and quality decisions.
6Our framework also addresses the endogeneity of quality in the estimation of demand, an important
econometric problem in its own right. Relatedly, see Ackerberg et al. (2011) for methods to consistently estimate
(only) price elasticities in the presence of endogenous product characteristics, which can be multidimensional
(unlike the case of scalar quality considered here).
7Furthermore, while cable system prices were regulated in 1992, the effects of these regulations were miti-
gated due to the nature of their implementation and were effectively withdrawn for the vast majority of cable
bundles by 1996. See Crawford and Shum (2007) for more detail on the regulations and the effects they had
on cable market quality.
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average input costs paid by cable systems for that channel.8 We also observe (at the market
level) variables that shift demand and costs across markets.
Based on our estimates of preferences and costs, we calculate consumer surplus, profit,
and thus total surplus associated with observed prices and qualities. We then simulate coun-
terfactual prices and qualities for a social planner offering the same number of products and
maximizing total surplus in each market and compare the qualities offered in the market with
those offered by a social planner.
Our results show that, compared to the social optimum, a profit-maximizing monopolist
sets both price and quality too high: that is, the monopolist overprovides quality. We estimate
that a social planner would lower qualities by between 23% and 55% (and prices by between
33% and 74%). A wide range of robustness checks and additional simulations establish that
this result is robust to changes in model parameters and specifications. While this evidence
for quality overprovision by cable operators reverses previous theoretical and empirical results
(Mussa and Rosen (1978), Crawford and Shum (2007)) emphasizing that a monopolist distorts
quality downwards, it provides empirical confirmation of theoretical results from Champsaur
and Rochet (1989), who show how a monopolist facing competition from a high-end outside
option may optimally overprovide quality to its consumers. Indeed, additional results suggest
that it is the presence of high-end satellite competition which drives the overprovision result;
when we remove satellite competition, then the result essentially disappears.
In addition, the quality overprovision results implies that cable customers would prefer
lower quality (i.e., smaller) cable bundles at a lower price, and moving to this socially-optimal
product line would generate, on average, a more-than-twofold increase in consumer surplus.
Such a finding opens up an important new perspective for US policymakers concerned about
high and rising pay television prices.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the economic
intuition underlying the measurement of market power over quality. In Section 3 we describe
the institutional features of U.S. cable television markets that make estimating the model
there attractive as well as the data we are using for our analysis. In Section 4 we describe
the equilibrium demand and supply framework underlying our empirical model. In Section
5 we elaborate on details of model specification, and discuss the identification of structural
parameters and our choice of instrumental variables for estimation. Section 6 presents our
estimation results, and also the results from counterfactual experiments which compare the
observed prices and qualities to socially optimal values. Section 7 delves into the robustness
of and explanations for the quality overprovision result. Section 8 concludes.
8Thus channels that are expensive to the cable system (ESPN, TNT, CNN, etc.) contribute more to the
measured quality of a cable bundle than channels that are inexpensive to the system.
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2 Market power over quality
In this section we describe the economic intuition underlying market power over quality.
Following Spence (1975), we begin with the simplest case where a single product monopolist
chooses quality, q, and price, P , and each consumer buys one unit of the good. Let P (s, q)
denote the inverse demand function facing the monopolist, where s denotes quantity, and let
C(s, q) = c(q)s be a constant returns to scale cost function. The monopolist’s first order
conditions for quantity and quality controls are then
F.O.C.M [ s ] : P (s, q) + Ps(s, q)s = c(q), (1)
F.O.C.M [ q ] : Pq(s, q) = cq(q), (2)
where Pq(s, q) is Spence’s “marginal valuation of quality” (MVQ) for the s
th consumer.9
A social planner maximizes total surplus
max
s,q
{∫ s
0
P (s′, q)ds′ − c(q)s
}
,
yielding first order conditions for quantity and quality that equate the marginal social benefit
of each with their marginal cost,10
F.O.C.SP [ s ] : P (s, q) = c(q), (3)
F.O.C.SP [ q ] :
1
s
∫ s
0
Pq(s
′, q)ds′ = cq(q). (4)
While the difference between (1) and (3) is familiar as a manifestation of market power over
price, the difference between (2) and (4) shows that profit maximizing and socially optimal
quality levels are also likely to be different. While the monopolist equates the marginal quality
cost, cq(q), to the marginal value of quality for the marginal (s
th) consumer, Pq(s, q), the social
planner equates it to the marginal value of quality to the marginal value of quality, averaged
across all consumers, 1s
∫ s
0 Pq(s
′, q)ds′.
In our empirical model below, preference heterogeneity is multidimensional, depending
on the distribution of random coefficients and utility shocks which vary across households as
well as across product offerings. In this more complex, but arguably more realistic setup, we
cannot define “marginal” or “inframarginal” consumers. Nevertheless, Spence’s main insight
remains, that market power can lead to either over- or under-provision of quality (relative to
the social planner) depending on households’ preferences.
Models of multi-product monopoly quality choice typically apply principal-agent models of
adverse selection like those used in the analysis of optimal nonlinear pricing. Seminal papers
9If P (s, q) measures the willingness-to-pay of the sth consumer, then Pq(s, q) measures how much her WTP
increases with increases in quality.
10Eq. (4) assumes that differentiation under the integral sign is possible, which is satisfied for the parametric
demand specifications considered in this paper, which are continuously differentiable.
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in this area include Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984). Under standard
assumptions, a common set of results emerge: (1) quality to the highest type is set efficiently
(i.e. there are no “Spence-ian” distortions at the top of the type distribution), (2) qualities
to lower types are degraded downwards, (3) prices are set such that the lowest type receives
no surplus, and (4) higher types earn positive surplus (“information rents”).
However, an important restriction in this model is that the consumers’ main alternative to
the monopolist’s offerings are a low-quality outside option; this drives the quality degradation
result as the monopolist will optimally engage in quality degradation to low-valuation con-
sumers in order to extract more surplus from high-valuation consumers. It turns out that this
result depends crucially on the location of the outside option on the quality spectrum; indeed,
Champsaur and Rochet (1989, section 3) show that, if one were to make the outside option
a high-end alternative, then the result can reverse; that is, the monopolist may overprovide
quality in order to optimally extract surplus from its consumers. This may be a relevant
scenario for cable television markets, as an important alternative to the cable companies’
offerings are those of direct-broadcast satellite (DBS) providers, who offer more extensive
(larger) and (often) more expensive bundles relative to cable TV bundles.
As this summary of the theory has highlighted, market power can lead to either quality
over- or under-provision, depending on features of consumer heterogeneity and preferences, as
well as market structure and competition. Ultimately, then, the direction of cable monopolists’
quality distortions is an empirical question, which we focus on in what follows.
3 Data and institutional details
Cable television, formerly known as Community Antenna Television or CATV, emerged in the
late 1940s in Arkansas, Oregon and Pennsylvania to deliver broadcast signals to the remote
areas with poor over-the-air reception.11 In these areas homes were connected to the antenna
towers located at the high points via cable networks. Starting with 70 cable systems serving
about 14,000 subscribers in 1952, a decade later almost 800 cable systems served about 850,000
subscribers. By October 1998 the number of cable systems reached 10,700 providing service
to more than 65 million subscribers in 32,000 communities (FCC 2000).
Specifically, cable television systems select a portfolio of programming networks, bundle
them into one or more services and offer these services to households in local, geographically
separate, cable markets. Systems typically offer three types of networks: broadcast networks,
cable networks, and premium networks.12
11See National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA), http://www.ncta.com/About/About/
HistoryofCableTelevision.aspx (accessed March 01, 2009).
12Broadcast networks are television signals broadcast in the local cable market and then collected and
retransmitted by cable systems. Examples include the major, national broadcast networks - ABC, CBS, NBC,
and FOX - as well as public and independent television stations. Cable networks are advertising-supported
general and special-interest networks distributed nationally to systems via satellite, such as MTV, CNN, and
ESPN. Premium networks are advertising-free entertainment networks, typically offering full-length feature
films, such as HBO and Showtime.
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Broadcast and cable networks are typically bundled by cable systems and offered as Basic
Service. Some systems, however, elect to split up these networks and offer a subset of them
as Expanded Basic Services. Starting in the late 1990s, cable systems invested in digital
technologies, allowing them to offer more television signals on a given infrastructure. At
this time, they often introduced additional bundles of networks called Digital Basic Services.
Expanded and Digital Basic Services were only available to households who had purchased
the Basic Service bundle.
The institutional and economic environment in the cable television industry suggests the
choice of quality and price of Basic, Expanded Basic, and Digital Basic Services may map well
to the theory. Since households that buy Expanded and Digital Basic Services must necessarily
first purchase Basic Service, these services are by construction increasing in overall quality.
Furthermore, since they consist of (generally large) bundles of individual networks, the range
of qualities possibly chosen is plausibly continuous, and offered qualities are clearly discrete.13
An important feature of cable system management is their almost complete control over
the content (quality) and price of their bundles. While certain regulations mandate systems
carry all broadcast television stations available over the air in their service area (so-called
“Must-Carry” requirements), beyond these restrictions they may select and package whatever
television networks they like for sale to households.14 With respect to prices, cable systems
have been subject to cyclical regulatory oversight.15 Most recently, the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act removed price controls on Expanded and Digital Basic Services, leaving only Basic
Service subject to possible, though extremely weak regulation.
Until the 1990s, local cable systems were effectively natural monopolies as they faced
virtually no competition except in a few cases of ”overbuilt” systems where the same location
was served by more than one cable company. Direct broadcast satellite (DBS) service was
launched in the early 90s and originally was popular mostly in rural areas where cable service
did not exist. Since then the number of subscribers of DBS providers has experienced rapid
growth, as shown in Table 1.
DBS and cable operators use different quality and price setting strategies. While satellite
operators set prices and products uniformly at the national level, cable systems make pricing
and programming decisions locally. We model this difference by assuming that the evolution
of satellite product and price options changes exogenously over time and that cable televisions
systems respond strategically to these changes. In each local market, cable television systems
13In a complementary line of analysis, Crawford (2008) and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) consider the
incentives to bundle networks into Basic Services. This line of work tests the discriminatory incentives to
bundle: namely that it by reducing heterogeneity in consumer tastes, bundling implicitly sorts consumers in a
manner similar to 2nd-degree price discrimination.
14Must-carry requirement do not appear to be a binding constraint on the firms’ bundle choices, as the
proportion of free of charge networks included in cable firms’ bundles (an upper bound on the fraction of
must-carry channels) is typically quite small.
15The most recent incident of price regulation was the 1992 Cable Act, the intent of which was to limit the
prices charged for Basic and Expanded Basic Services. Due to a combination of factors, including strategic
responses by cable systems to the imposed regulations and relatively weak cost pass-through (“going-forward”)
requirements, these provided little benefit to households (Hazlett and Spitzer (1997), Crawford (2000)).
7
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3154811 
Table 1: DBS penetration rates in 2001-2004
2001 2004 Change
Rural 26% 29% 12%
Suburban 14% 18% 29%
Urban 9% 13% 44%
Source: GAO report to the U.S. Senate, April 2005
are still therefore monopolists, but face a residual demand curve which depends on the presence
and product choices of satellite TV operators.16
We have compiled a market-level dataset on a cross-section of United States cable systems
to estimate the model. The primary source of data for these systems is Warren Publishing’s
Television and Cable Factbook Directory of Cable Systems. The data for this paper consists
of the population of cable systems recorded in the 1997-2006 editions of the Factbook for
which complete information was available.17 From the population, a sample of 3,931 systems
remained. An observation in the data is a cable system-year.
Table 2 presents sample statistics for selected variable for these systems. Cable systems
varied in the number of years they were in the sample, ranging from 1 to 9 years, implying
an unbalanced panel. Sample cable systems offer between one and three bundles, while
satellite systems offer between three and six (with exactly three from 2002).18 We measure
the quality of a bundle by the weighted average of the number of television networks offered
on that bundle. The weights are given by the national average input cost (“affiliate fee”)
paid by cable systems for that network, which is the carriage cost negotiated between that
network and cable systems, averaged across all cable systems nationwide. This follows earlier
empirical work by Chu (2010) and Shcherbakov (2016). As expected, prices and qualities
are increasing across product tiers.19 Moreover, we see that at every tier (low, medium, or
high), the measured quality of satellite bundles exceeds that of cable bundles, which can be
interpreted to imply that in these markets, satellite products provide a high-end alternative
16This accurately characterizes the pay television market in the sample period (1997-2006). During these
years, DBS companies (Dish and DirectTV) set their products and prices at a nationwide level, whereas
individual cable systems were permitted significant discretion in setting their channel lineups and prices to
match local demand conditions, even when they were part of a larger Multiple System Operator (MSO, e.g.
Comcast or Time Warner). In such a market context, even if DBS companies were to respond to cable firms,
they would do so at a national level, and such a response would be diffused and of second-order importance
for local-market outcomes.
17While there are over 11,000 systems per year in the sample, persistence in non-response over time as well as
incomplete reporting of critical variables required imposing a large number of conditions in order for a system
to be included in each sample. Missing information on prices, quantities, and reporting dates were responsible
for the majority of the exclusions.
18Satellite market shares are only available at a much wider level of aggregation than cable shares. Satellite
data are reported for each of 210 Nielsen Designated Market Areas (DMA), each of which typically contain
many local cable system markets. Following Chu (2007), in order to compute satellite market share in each
cable market we assume that within a DMA satellite subscribers constitute a constant proportion of the
non-cable subscribers.
19Prices for cable and satellite services were adjusted by CPI with 1997 as the base year.
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to cable products. This observation will play an important role in what follows.
Figure 1 presents histogram for aggregate cable and satellite market shares as well as for
product-specific cable market shares.
Figure 1: Histograms for cable and satellite market shares
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3.1 Preliminary evidence of quality over-/under-provision
The theory literature beginning with Mussa and Rosen (1978) connects market power with
quality degradation for low-quality products offered by multi-product firms, and Crawford
and Shum (2007) investigated whether indeed prices-per-channel in cable markets were higher
for low-quality cable services. In Table 3, we present some exploratory evidence of quality
degradation along the lines of Crawford and Shum (2007), using both their measure of product
quality, price-per-channel, as well as the measure of product quality for which we advocate
above, price-per-weighted-channel, with weights given by the national average input fee for
each channel.
The evidence is largely inconclusive. While there is some evidence of higher prices-per-
channel for lower-quality cable services, the significant heterogeneity in the raw underlying
data prevents the differences from being statistically significant.
Going one step further, Champsaur and Rochet’s (1989) model shows that a monopolist
may engage in quality overprovision, when it faces competition from a high-end substitute. We
look for reduced form evidence of this by analyzing variation in the presence of the high-end
(satellite) outside option across markets; specifically, variation in when DBS begin carrying
local channels and, thus, become a true “high-end” substitute for cable services. These data
9
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Table 2: Data summary statistics, 1997-2006
Mean StdDev Min Max
Periods and Products
Time periods, years 2.1 1.2 1 9
Cable products 1.5 0.7 1 3
Satellite products 5.2 1.4 3 6
Market shares
sc 0.54 0.19 0.05 0.90
ss 0.15 0.12 0.01 0.88
Prices
Cable
pcLow $20.44 $7.71 $2.68 $81.86
pcMed $32.77 $14.59 $7.88 $136.30
pcHigh $60.28 $23.79 $16.90 $291.08
Satellite
psLow $21.69 $9.33 $14.44 $39.24
psMed $27.15 $9.06 $19.26 $43.61
psHigh $45.95 $22.94 $28.89 $87.22
Quality
Cable
qcLow 3.09 1.81 0.30 13.13
qcMed 5.76 2.63 0.71 16.86
qcHigh 9.11 3.45 2.34 19.02
Satellite
qsLow 5.12 3.49 1.78 11.73
qsMed 6.48 3.16 3.30 12.67
qsHigh 10.77 6.51 5.65 27.88
Other Vars
Length of cable network, miles 0.160 0.560 0.000 17.690
Channel capacity 44.9 20.2 5 542
Before 2002
psT ier3 $35.98 $4.26 $32.75 $43.80
psT ier4 $41.10 $2.92 $38.53 $46.59
psT ier5 $54.67 $12.65 $46.23 $77.35
qsT ier3 7.42 1.78 5.93 10.44
qsT ier4 8.01 1.75 6.53 10.96
qsT ier5 9.45 3.49 6.96 15.44
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for our estimation sample. Cable information is drawn from
Warren Publishing’s Television and Cable Factbook; satellite information was collected by hand. There are as
many as six satellite products until 2001 and only three afterwards. Market shares reported in the table are
aggregated across all products offered on each platform (cable, satellite). Prices are in 1997 dollars. Low (or the
only one if 1 product), Medium (second highest across having 2+ products), and High (third among 3-product
markets) quality or price products are indexed by {0, 1, 2} in the modeling section. The quality of a product is
the weighted average of the number of television networks offered on that product, with weights given by the
national average input cost (“affiliate fee”) paid by cable systems for that network from SNL Kagan. Length of
cable network measures the size of the physical cable network, while channel capacity measures the maximum
number of channels a given cable system can broadcast using its current physical network and compression
technology. These data is augmented with market-level data on demographics from 2000 US Census.
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Table 3: Exploratory evidence of quality degradation
Three-Good Markets Two-Good Markets
Mean Diff Mean Diff
Prices-per-channel
pc2/channels2 1.28 (0.64) 0.46 (0.34) 1.38 (0.82) -0.31 (1.50)
pc1/channels1 0.81 (0.40) -0.42 (0.87) 1.69 (1.50)
pc0/channels0 1.23 (1.04)
Prices-per-weighted-channel
pc2/qc2 7.27 (2.74) 2.03 (1.74) 6.60 (2.39) -4.26 (10.02)
pc1/qc1 5.24 (2.21) -5.11 (7.52) 10.86 (10.20)
pc0/qc0 10.34 (8.21)
Observations 1,360 3,727
Notes: Reported are the average price per channel and price per weighted channel for each offered cable service
in our estimation sample. Weights are given by the national average input cost for that channel in the relevant
year. Values in the “Difference” columns are the difference in price per channel in that row and the row that
follows. Standard errors are in parentheses.
are available for about 6,610 markets (54% of total number of markets). Table 4 summarizes
the results of this exercise.20 Across all markets and product tiers, we see evidence of higher
quality when DBS offers local channels.21
Table 4: Cable quality choice and DBS carriage of local channels
variable DBS carriage of No DBS carriage of difference
local channels local channels
1-product, qc0 4.09 3.87 0.22
2-product, qc0 4.51 3.97 0.54
2-product, qc1 6.38 5.94 0.44
3-product, qc0 3.01 2.44 0.57
3-product, qc1 8.95 7.92 1.03
3-product, qc2 10.85 9.53 1.32
As with any reduced-form analysis, there are a number of confounding factors. The
launch date for local channels could be endogenous as regulations allowing DBS to carry local
channels were first allowed in November 1999 (also known as “The Satellite Home Viewer
Improvement Act”). If cable firms anticipate DBS launching local channels in the future,
they may act preemptively. On the other hand, DBS may choose to launch local channels
20Differences for each year are available upon request.
21In Appendix A we present supplementary regression results which show that cable firms choose higher
levels of quality in years close to the satellite competitor’s decision to carry local channels.
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in markets that would experience high growth rates in the future.22 In this case, profitable
developments in the market may affect both the decision of DBS to introduce local channels
earlier and the decision of cable firms to improve product quality.
While suggestive, the reduced form evidence here is uninformative as to how much a
monopolist distorts quality and prices from their efficient levels. In order to quantify this,
we specify and estimate a structural model of demand, pricing, and quality choice in cable
television markets, which we introduce in the next section.
4 Model
Consider a market, n, served by two providers of paid television service – cable and satellite,
denoted with g ∈ {c, s}, each offering multiple products indexed by j ∈ Jgn. Our model
is static and, for simplicity, we omit time subscripts such that n denotes both market and
time. One can characterize a multi-product cable carrier offering Jcn distinct products by
their monthly subscription fees, pcjn, and quality of programming content, qcjn, which we
assume can be summarized by a scalar.
4.1 Demand
There are a continuum of consumers, indexed by i, whose preferences for a product j offered
by a provider g depend on the monthly subscription fee, pjgn, and service quality, qjgn, of
that product. Let i’s indirect utility function be given by
Uijgn =
{
δgjn(pgjn, qgjn, Y¯in, ξgn;ωi) + ign, for product j of provider g in market n,
i0n, otherwise,
(5)
where ωi denotes consumer i’s heterogeneous preferences.
23 These are assumed to be known
to consumer i, but unobserved by the econometrician. ξgn denotes unobserved characteristics
of provider g in market n, and Y¯in is a vector of observable demand shifters (e.g. consumer
demographics). Both the unobserved characteristics, ξgn, and the idiosyncratic preference
draw, ign, are provider-specific and not product-specific (i.e. both depend on g instead of j).
There are several reasons for these assumptions. First, they are consistent with the institu-
tional features of the industry, where higher quality products always include all programming
content carried on low quality products. The second reason is data-driven. For a large num-
ber of markets we do not observe product-specific cable market shares, e.g., these data are
missing for 15% of observations in 2-product markets and 35% of observations in 3-product
markets. Therefore, allowing for product-specific unobservables would reduce our sample con-
siderably. (We never observe satellite product-specific market shares and, therefore, cannot
22In our data we cannot see this because our demographics are fixed at their values in year 2000.
23In the empirical model below, they will include random coefficients on price and quality.
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model product-specific unobservables for the DBS alternative.) We assume ign is distributed
as Type I Extreme Value.
4.1.1 Total provider shares
Let p¯gn and q¯gn denote observable vectors of prices and quality levels for all products offered
by provider g ∈ {c, s} in market n and let the maximum utility a consumer type i achieves
by choosing among the products offered by provider g be given by
δgn(p¯gn, q¯gn, Y¯in, ξg;ωi) = max
j′∈Jgn
{δgj′n(pgj′n, qgj′n, Y¯in, ξgn;ωi)} (6)
Because ign is common to all the indirect utilities, Uigj′n, ∀j′ ∈ Jgn, it doesn’t influence the
choice of product within provider for consumer type i.
The probability that a consumer of type i chooses g in n is given by:
Pgn(ωi) =
exp(δgn(p¯gn, q¯gn, Y¯in, ξgn;ωi))
1 + exp(δcn(p¯cn, q¯cn, Y¯in, ξcn;ωi)) + exp(δsn(p¯sn, q¯sn, Y¯in, ξsn;ωi))
. (7)
and the aggregate market share of g in n is obtained by integrating over the distribution of
consumer heterogeneity, dF (ωi):
sgn =
∫
exp(δgn(p¯gn, q¯gn, Y¯in, ξgn;ωi))
1 + exp(δcn(p¯cn, q¯cn, Y¯in, ξcn;ωi)) + exp(δsn(p¯sn, q¯sn, Y¯in, ξsn;ωi))
dF (ωi). (8)
From the definition of δgn(·) and equation (8) it follows that
sgn = sgn(p¯cn, q¯cn, p¯sn, q¯sn, Y¯n, ξcn, ξsn; θd),
where ξcn and ξsn are the only two unobservable to the econometrician provider characteristics
and θd is a vector of demand parameters that includes parameters governing the distribution
of ωi and measuring the influence of demographic variables, Y¯n. Under standard assumptions,
we can use the Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995) inversion to solve the system of equations{
scn = scn(p¯cn, q¯cn, p¯sn, q¯sn, Y¯n, ξcn, ξsn; θd),
ssn = ssn(p¯cn, q¯cn, p¯sn, q¯sn, Y¯n, ξcn, ξsn; θd)
(9)
for a pair (ξcn, ξsn) that makes observed cable and satellite market shares (left-hand-side
variables) equal to the ones predicted by our model.
4.1.2 Conditional product-specific shares
For most markets in our data, we do not observe product-specific shares. However, for the
markets for which product-specific shares are available, we do not discard them as they are
informative about consumer price and quality preference parameters. Hence, to incorporate
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these data, let Pjgn(ωi) denote the probability that consumer type i chooses product j of
provider g in market n. Let sj|g,n denote the market share of tier j given the choice of
provider g with
∑
j∈Jgn sj|g,n = 1 by construction. Then the model’s prediction for this share
is described by the following equation
sj|g,n =
∫
1(j = arg maxj′∈Jg{δgj′(pgj′ , qgj′ , Y¯in, ξg;ωi})Pgn(ωi)dF (ωi)∫
Pgn(ωi)dF (ωi)
(10)
Since there are no structural errors here, we introduce measurement error u to explain
differences between predicted and observed values of product-specific shares:
sj|g,n = sj|g,n(p¯cn, q¯cn, p¯sn, q¯sn, Y¯n, ξcn, ξsn; θd) + ugjn. (11)
4.2 Supply
We model optimal price and quality decisions by the local cable system in each market, n.
As alluded to earlier, we treat satellite providers’ prices and products as set exogenously.
Assumption 1: The satellite competitor is a nonstrategic player in the sense that it does not
react to policies (prices, qualities) chosen by local cable systems.
The per-subscriber marginal cost of providing product j in market n is
mccjn = mc(qcjn, Zcn; θs), (12)
where Zcn denotes a vector of observable cost shifters, and θs is a vector of supply-side cost
parameters. Together with the assumption that market size does not change over time, this
allows us to write the maximization problem for a cable system as follows
max
{pcjn,qcjn}j∈Jcn
 ∑
j∈Jcn
scjn(p¯cn, q¯cn, p¯sn, q¯sn, ξcn, ξsn; θd)(pcjn −mc(qcjn, Zcn; θs))
 (13)
This specification assumes that the marginal quantity cost of providing cable service is con-
stant across subscribers (i.e. no economies or diseconomies of scale), but that this (constant)
marginal cost increases with the quality of the offered service. This specification fits well the
cable industry where the most important marginal costs facing systems are the input costs
(“affiliate fees”) paid to television networks, which are constant per-subscriber fees.24
24See Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) for more details about these contracts.
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The first-order conditions for cable operators’ price and quality are:
F.O.C. [pcjn] : scjn +
∑
r∈Jcn
(pcrn −mccrn)∂scrn
∂pcjn
= 0, (14)
F.O.C. [qcjn] : − ∂mccjn
∂qcjn
scjn +
∑
r∈Jcn
(pcrn −mccrn)∂scrn
∂qcjn
= 0. (15)
Equations (14) and (15) can be solved for the marginal cost levels, mccjn, and the derivatives of
the marginal cost function, ∂mccjn
/
∂qcjn, that rationalize observed price and quality choices
given the parameters of the model (more on this in Section 5.2 below).
We take the number of products offered by each cable system as given and exogenous to
systems’ price and quality decisions. This is reasonable in cable markets because the number
of products offered by cable systems often depends on the technology the system has in place
and therefore plausibly exogenous to annual price and quality decisions.25
5 Specification and estimation
Here we fill in specification details for consumers’ utility and cable systems’ cost functions.
5.1 Demand
On the demand side, we assume that consumer utility net of additive iid shocks ign is a linear
function of price, quality, and demographic characteristics, Y¯in
δgjn(pgjn, qgjn, Y¯in, ξg;ωi) = αip(Y¯in)pgjn + αiq(Y¯in)qgjn + ξgn, (16)
where
αip = ai0 + ayIn + ahHn + auUn, (17)
αiq = bi0 + byIn + bhHn + buUn, (18)
and In stands for income, Hn for household size, and Un for the level of urbanization in
market n. These market-level variables are assumed to have the same effect on the price and
quality sensitivity parameters for all consumer types. Two additional parameters ai0 and bi0
25Similar timing assumptions are invoked in the empirical measurement of productivity (e.g. Olley and Pakes
(1996), Ackerberg et al. (2015)). More generally, the model in the paper can be thought of as the second stage
of a larger model in which firms choose first the number of products before choosing the quality levels of each
product. As such, we should interpret our findings of quality overprovision below as a short-run effect when
adjusting the number of products is not possible; in the long-run, such distortions may change as firms change
the number of products they offer.
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are i-specific and have a flexible variance-covariance matrix, i.e.,ai0
bi0
 ∼ N
a¯0
b¯0
, Σ
 , Σ =
σ2a ρab
ρab σ
2
b
 (19)
On the demand side we estimate the parameters:
θd =
(
αc, αs, [a¯0, ay, ah, au], [b¯0, by, bh, bu], σa, σb, ρab
)
.
5.2 Supply
In order to evaluate the counterfactuals for the social planner’s quality choices, we need to
know the entire marginal cost function for each cable operator, not just the costs at the
observed quality levels.26 Hence, we specify a flexible yet parsimonious specification for the
marginal cost function:
mc (qcjn, Zcn; θs) = exp
(
c0jn + c1jnqjcn
)
. (20)
The exponential functional form is consistent with the cable systems’ facing technological
capacity constraints when adding high quality networks into their channel lineup.27
We follow the existing literature (e.g., Berry et al. (1995)) to generate moment restrictions
for the supply-side. For a given vector of parameter values, we can solve the supply-side first
order conditions to obtain estimates of the marginal costs m̂ccjn and ∂m̂ccjn/∂qcjn, which in
turn are used to compute cˆ0jn and cˆ1jn as follows,
cˆ0jn = ln(m̂ccjn)− ∂m̂ccjn/∂qcjn
m̂ccjn
qcjn,
cˆ1jn =
∂m̂ccjn/∂qcjn
m̂ccjn
.
In turn, we assume that these coefficients can be specified as linear functions of observable
cost shifters and a pair of structural error terms, (ν0cjn, ν1cjn).
28 That is, we project cˆ0jn and
cˆ1jn on Zcn, i.e.,
cˆ0jn = Zcjnθs0 + ν0cjn,
cˆ1jn = Zcjnθs1 + ν1cjn,
26As usual in these models, since we base estimation on suppliers’ first-order conditions, we cannot model
their fixed costs. However, the data show that quality levels are not systematically higher in larger markets
(the graphs are available upon request), implying that the scale of the firm is not playing a big role in its
quality choices.
27The particular functional form chosen for the marginal cost function is not critical for the identification of
model parameters. In principle, with more products for each producer, we could additional parameters into
the marginal cost function for a less parsimonious specification.
28We refer to the errors as “structural” because they are observed by cable system before price and quality
decisions are made.
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to recover ν1cjn and ν2cjn satisfying
E[ν0cjn|Zcjn] = E[ν1cjn|Zcjn] = 0.
5.3 Instruments and identification
As we discussed in Section 4.1, for each value of the parameter vector θd, we solve for a pair of
provider-specific structural errors, (ξcn, ξsn), and a set of non-structural measurement errors,
ucjn, for cable providers using aggregate cable and satellite market shares, prices and observed
quality levels for each tier offered, and tier-specific cable market shares. On the supply side,
we described in the previous section how we obtain, for each parameter vector, the pair of
structural errors (ν1cjn, ν2cjn) per product. Identification of the structural parameters relies
on a set of conditional independence assumptions summarized by Assumption 2 below.29
Assumption 2: Unobservables and identifying assumptions.
(2.1) For each service provider g in market n, the unobserved service characteristics can be
written as
ξgn = α¯g + αgt + ξ˜gn
where α¯g is provider-specific intercept, αgt is provider-specific time effect, and (ξ˜cn, ξ˜sn, )
satisfy the following mean independence assumptions
E[ξ˜cn|Z¯cn] = E[ξ˜sn|Z¯sn] = 0.
(2.2) Measurement errors for markets with 2 and 3 cable products satisfy
E[ucjn|Z¯cn] = 0, j = 1, 2. (21)
(2.3) Supply side cost shocks for each product offered are linear functions of cost shifters,
c0jn = Z¯cnθs0 + ν0cjn,
c1jn = Z¯cnθs1 + ν1cjn,
where
E[ν0cjn|Y¯n, Z¯cn] = E[ν1cjn|Y¯n, Z¯cn] = 0.
29While the assumption suggests that the instrumetal variables for cable and satellite innovations, Z¯cn
and Z¯sn, can be different (e.g., we can use own satellite price and quality as instruments for satellite own
innovations) we use more conservative assumption that Z¯sn = Z¯cn.
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It is worth noting that in estimation we control for carrier-time demand side fixed effects, αgt,
i.e., we control for time effects, which vary by service provider (cable or satellite). Similarly,
we use carrier-time dummies on the supply side as well, i.e., Z¯cn contains these variables.
There is an obvious endogeneity problem because cable companies observe realizations of
(ξcn, ξsn) prior to making their price and quality choices. Therefore, prices and qualities are
likely to be correlated with the unobserved service characteristics, ξcn and ξsn. For finding
instruments, we use the following arguments, adapted from Shcherbakov (2016).
First, we assume that the average prices and quality levels of other cable systems that
belong to the same multiple system operator (MSO) are valid instrumental variables for prices
and quality levels of the local provider. We assume that these variables are uncorrelated with
the unobserved local market service characteristics, ξ·n, but are reasonable proxies for the
price and quality levels offered by the local cable system. Correlation in prices and quality
levels across systems exists because the owner of several cable systems typically negotiates
programming fees and other contract arrangements with programming networks on behalf of
all of its members simultaneously. In turn, correlation in the marginal costs of systems within
the same MSO justifies correlation in their price and quality levels. At the same time, for
the instruments to be valid, one must ensure that the unobserved demand shocks, ξ·n are
not correlated across markets. For example, this would be a concern if there were national
advertising of cable products across the markets owned by a single MSO; fortunately for this
specification, this is not the case in cable markets during our sample period.30
Second, different MSOs have different bargaining power in negotiations with programming
networks. It may be that larger MSOs (i.e. those with more total subscribers) have stronger
bargaining positions. Hence, we use the number of MSO subscribers as a cost shifter.31
Third, programming networks often sell bundles consisting of several channels. The ability
to purchase such bundles depends on the system’s channel capacity. Thus, average channel
capacity within an MSO should be correlated with the ability of their member-systems to get
lower rates. By the same logic, we used own capacity level as another instrumental variable.
Fourth, total length of own coaxial lines of the local cable systems is a proxy for the differences
in maintenance costs incurred by the systems in areas with different densities of houses.
Our baseline set of instruments includes all of these variables. To demonstrate the effects
of the instruments and for robustness, however, we also consider specifications in which all
variables instrument for themselves (hereafter “OLS-type” instruments) and using a minimal
30Crawford (2008) discusses this class of instruments in detail and why they work well in cable markets.
31Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) found that large MSOs were estimated to have more bargaining power than
small MSOs and satellite providers. Indeed, the logic that larger systems are able to obtain better wholesale
prices for channels underlies the choice of some of our demand-side instrumental variables. Such an effect could
provide an alternative “cost-side” explanation for quality overprovision. However, one way to disentangle this
from the “demand-side” quality overprovision of the Champsaur and Rochet (1989) theory is to note that the
bargaining power story does not depend on DBS presence whereas, as we will demonstrate below, the quality
overprovision we document obtains only when a DBS competitor is present.
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set of instruments consisting only of the ownership-based (MSO) instruments (hereafter “min-
IV”). These results are reported in Appendix B in Table 12 together with additional robustness
checks for alternative measures of quality in Table 13.
There are three sets of moment conditions as described by Assumption (2): (1) moments
associated with the unobserved product characteristics (i.e., demand-side shocks), (2) mo-
ments associated with the supply-side shocks, and (3) measurement errors in conditional
cable shares. Measurement errors in conditional cable product shares are uncorrelated with
other variables by definition. We also assume no correlation between demand- and supply-side
innovations. However, demand side unobservables for cable and satellite can be correlated
with each other, i.e., cov(ξcn, ξsn) 6= 0. We exploit this information when constructing the
weighting matrix and criterion function for the estimation.32 The structural parameters are
estimated by GMM with an optimal weighting matrix.
6 Estimation results
6.1 Parameter Estimates
Demand. Table 5 summarizes our estimation results for two specifications. Specification
(2) includes demographics at the market level, while specification (1) omits them. While
demographic variables appear to be quite important determinants of the price sensitivity,
they are not statistically significant determinants of preferences for quality. Parameters of the
distribution of unobserved consumer heterogeneity are statistically significant with tastes for
quality having much wider dispersion than price sensitivity. Figure 2 describes the estimated
distributions of price and quality parameters across markets.
Figure 2: Distributions of mean price and quality parameters across markets.
Notes: Reported are the estimated distributions of mean price and quality parameters across markets implied
by the parameter estimates reported in Table 5.
32In particular, individual moments based on ξ˜cn and ξ˜sn are “stacked” horizontally and are treated as
distinct moment conditions, i.e., averaging is done separately for cable and satellite moments. In contrast, in
Berry et al. (1995) and the following literature, the averaging for the moment conditions is across the available
products, which in our case would be the cable and satellite products.
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Table 5: Estimation results
parameter
(1) (2)
coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
price coefficient, αip
mean -0.673 (0.008) -0.682 (0.035)
income -0.418 (0.147)
household size 0.396 (0.271)
urban -0.173 (0.177)
sigma 0.102 (0.018) 0.122 (0.018)
quality coefficient, αiq
mean 1.108 (0.121) 1.225 (0.241)
income -0.337 (0.777)
household size 0.221 (1.395)
urban 0.331 (0.917)
sigma 0.310 (0.020) 0.266 (0.048)
ρab -0.545 (0.128) -0.481 (0.049)
demand t-dummies Yes Yes
supply t-dummies Yes Yes
Notes: Reported are estimation results for key parameters from our structural model of demand, price, and
quality choice. There are 12,214 observations, where an observation is a cable system-product-year. Full
estimation results can be found in Appendix C. Specification (1) does not include market demographics in
preferences, while specification (2) does. Standard errors are clustered by market and listed in parenthe-
ses. Instruments include all those described in Section 5.3; results using each variable as its own instrument
(OLS-type) and a minimal set of instruments based on ownership (MSO) measures (min-IV) are presented in
Appendix B. First stage regressions are reported in Appendix D.
Turning to the estimates for ρab, the correlation between the random coefficients on price
and quality, we see that without demographic controls, this correlation is an estimated -0.545,
indicating that the most price sensitive consumers also have the greatest quality sensitivity.33
Once market-level demographics are included, the correlation in unobserved tastes for price
and quality falls (in magnitude) to an estimated -0.481. Additionally, to illustrate the impli-
cations of these estimates of the consumer heterogeneity parameters on demand, Figures 8,
9 in Appendix A display the consumer purchase probabilities for cable and satellite products
for different consumer types (as given by their random coefficient parameters).
Estimated own-price elasticities across markets average -5.2 for one-good markets, and -5.3
33Trends in the home television market after the sample period offer evidence in line with this finding of
negative correlation. In particular, in recent years the phenomenon of “cord cutting” has been documented,
in which cable (and satellite, to a lesser extent) consumers have terminated their service in favor of outside
options such as streaming services (eg. Netflix, Apple TV, etc.). This practice is particularly pronouned among
higher income, young professionals and demonstrates that these individuals, who plausibly have higher tastes
for quality, may be those who are most sensitive to cable prices.
20
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3154811 
in multi-good (both two and three products) markets.34 The magnitude of these elasticities
are similar to those found in the literature.35
Results for two alternative specifications are reported in Appendix B. In an OLS-like spec-
ification, in which price and quality are treated as exogenous, yields a mean price coefficient
of -0.553, showing that instrumenting has the expected effect of making estimated demand
more elastic. A second alternative specification using a minimal set of instruments yields
qualitatively similar results, but with larger standard errors. The estimated negative correla-
tion ρab is robust in these specifications. For this reason, we rely on our baseline specification
presented in column (2) for our counterfactual simulations.
Table 6: Summary statistics for the supply side estimates.
system type variable mean p50 min max sd
1-product
mcc0 16.81 17.15 0.03 46.79 5.79
∂mcc0/∂qc0 1.90 1.90 1.03 2.96 0.13
2-product
mcc0 13.36 11.44 0.00 70.42 9.42
mcc1 25.47 22.53 1.50 96.06 11.93
∂mcc0/∂qc0 1.79 1.84 0.07 2.41 0.25
∂mcc1/∂qc1 13.49 7.41 0.66 114.75 13.71
3-product
mcc0 12.88 12.16 0.06 60.46 8.58
mcc1 28.61 26.31 2.20 99.36 12.97
mcc2 47.80 45.12 11.46 119.67 17.43
∂mcc0/∂qc0 1.77 1.83 0.12 2.40 0.26
∂mcc1/∂qc1 4.03 3.64 0.27 14.31 1.89
∂mcc2/∂qc2 20.79 16.73 2.04 129.47 14.74
Supply. The estimated distributions of marginal costs and their derivatives at observed
quality levels are reported in Table 6. These suggest substantial variability in terms of tech-
nology levels (as implied by the cost function estimates) used by cable systems. Using these
estimates, we construct a flexible estimate of a firm’s marginal cost function by using a flexible
spline (Hermite) interpolation between the marginal cost levels and derivatives estimated at
the observed quality levels, as reported in Table 6, and using the exponential specification (Eq.
(20)) for extrapolation outside this range. Accordingly, for 1-product markets the marginal
34Histograms and further summary statistics for own price elasticities across markets are reported in Ap-
pendix A. Average estimated price-cost markups implied by these elasticity estimates are reported below in
Table 10.
35For example, Crawford et al. (2018) find elasticities ranging from -1.7 to -4.2 and Crawford and Yurukoglu
(2012) find elasticities ranging from -4.1 to -6.3. The latter also cites additional papers that find elasticities
ranging from a low of -1.5 to -5.9, depending on the product and platform considered.
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cost function is completely exponential. For 2- and 3-product markets it is exponential outside
the range of the observed quality levels, and a monotone Hermite spline in-between. By doing
this we are able to obtain a marginal cost function which utilizes all the information from the
estimates in Table 6, and yet is monotone, continuous, and continuously differentiable, which
are convenient features for computing counterfactuals.
Figure 3: Estimated marginal cost functions by system type
Notes: Reported are the estimated marginal cost functions by system type (1, 2, or 3-product) and by product
within each system type implied by the parameter estimates reported in Table 6.
Figure 3 shows estimated marginal cost functions for 1, 2, and 3-product firms implied by
our estimates. As is apparent, high quality systems on average have lower and flatter (less
steeply increasing) marginal costs, perhaps as a result of using more advanced technology.
Single-product firms have the highest and steepest marginal cost curves.
6.2 Welfare effects from endogenous quality
To quantify firms’ quality distortions in this market, we need to compare observed outcomes
with counterfactual ones given by a social planner. The social planner problem is to maximize
total surplus, defined as the sum of consumer surplus and producer profit.
Let αip denote the price sensitivity of consumer type i. The expected consumer surplus
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(CSin) for type i in market n is then defined as
E(CSin) = − 1
αip
E[max
gjn
{uigjn}]
= − 1
αip
ln
(
1 +
∑
g=c,s
exp
(
δgjn(pgjn, qgjn, Y¯in, ξg;ωi})
))
,
(22)
where uigjn is given by equation (5), and the second line follows from the distributional
assumption on ign. Total consumer surplus in market n is then obtained by integrating over
the distribution of consumer heterogeneity, i.e.,
E(CSn) = −
∫
1
αip
ln
(
1 +
∑
g=c,s
exp
(
δgjn(pgjn, qgjn, Y¯in, ξg;ωi})
))
dF (ωi). (23)
Accordingly, the first-order conditions for the social planner are:
F.O.C.SP [pcjn] :
∂Π(·)
∂pcjn
+
∂E(CSn)
∂pcjn
= 0, (24)
F.O.C.SP [qcjn] :
∂Π(·)
∂qcjn
+
∂E(CSn)
∂qcjn
= 0, (25)
where
∂Π(·)
∂pcjn
and
∂Π(·)
∂qcjn
were given earlier by the left-hand-sides of equations (14) and (15)
respectively.
We calculate the optimal social planner’s quality and price using (24) and (25), given
our estimates of consumer preferences and operator cost functions described in the previous
section. The results are summarized in Table 7. Table 11 in Appendix A reports detailed
factual and counterfactual price and quality levels.
Turning first to Column A, we find, at observed prices, monopoly cable operators under-
provide (or degrade) quality: the quality of low-quality products provided by a social planner
are predicted to increase by 55%, while qualities for medium- and high-quality products by
are predicted to increase by 7%. Consumers surplus increases by an estimated 43%, firm
profits fall by an estimated 33%, and total surplus increases by an estimated 10%. The
quality degradation finding here is not surprising as, with prices fixed, the socially optimal
quality level is that at which the marginal cost of quality is exactly equal to the price; hence,
for the monopolist to overprovide quality at fixed prices is impossible as that would imply
setting quality at a level where the marginal cost of quality exceeds the price, which neither
the monopolist nor social planner would do.
In Column B, we hold fixed qualities at the social optimum levels, and consider lowering
prices from the observed levels to marginal cost (the socially optimal price level). The results
indicate that market power over price is also important. Prices fall between an estimated 33%
and 74%, consumer surplus rises by an estimated 54%, profits are eliminated by marginal cost
pricing, and total surplus increases by 7%.
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Table 7: Welfare effects of market power over quality (and price)
Column A: Column B: Column C:
Market Power Market Power Total
over Quality over Price Welfare Effect
(pObs,qObs) (pObs,qSP ) (pObs,qObs)
vs vs vs
(pObs,qSP ) (pSP ,qSP ) (pSP ,qSP )
Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev
Prices
Low-quality products — — -0.330 0.180 -0.330 0.180
Medium-quality products — — -0.590 0.220 -0.590 0.220
High-quality products — — -0.740 0.130 -0.740 0.130
Qualities
Low-quality products 0.550 0.720 — — -0.230 0.910
Medium-quality products 0.070 0.110 — — -0.370 0.410
High-quality products 0.070 0.040 — — -0.550 0.260
Welfare
Consumer surplus 0.430 0.290 0.540 0.420 1.160 0.520
Profit -0.330 0.240 -1.000 — -1.000 —
Total Surplus 0.100 0.060 0.070 0.050 0.170 0.070
Numbers in this table are proportional changes, relative to the baseline scenarios (at observed prices and
qualities).
Column C contains the most interesting patterns. The results from the third counterfac-
tual show that, when the social planner jointly sets prices and qualities, he would set quality
levels to be lower than the monopolists’ choices, i.e. the opposite of the quality degradation
shown in Column A. On average, socially optimal qualities would be lower by between 23%
and 55% compared to observed values (and by between 45% and 58% compared to the social
planner’s qualities at observed prices in Column A). This suggests that cable companies are
offering consumers overly large bundles of channels at correspondingly inflated prices; instead
consumers would prefer smaller (lower quality) bundles at lower prices. At the social opti-
mum, consumer surplus more than doubles (+116%) - an effect far greater than the effect of
efficient qualities or prices on their own - and total surplus increases by an estimated 17%.
Furthermore, when we examine the overprovision result market-by-market, we find that
multi-product cable firms tend to overprovide quality more often than single-product systems.
This is illustrated in Figure 4, which describes the frequency of under- and over-provision in
1-, 2-, and 3-product markets. It is evident from these graphs that there is a much higher pre-
ponderance of quality overprovision in multi-good markets, compared to single-good markets.
The left-most histogram in the top row of Figure 4, corresponding to single-product markets,
has most of its mass at positive values of the normalized quality difference q
TS−max−qpi−max
qpi−max , im-
plying quality degradation; in contrast, the remaining histograms, corresponding to two- and
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three-good markets, have most of the mass at negative values, implying quality overprovision.
Figure 4: Quality inflation for each product by type of cable system
Such results are new and surprising relative to the literature. The classic results from
Mussa and Rosen (1978) predict only quality degradation. However, Spence (1975) shows
that a monopolist can choose to overprovide quality (relative to the social planner) depending
on the curvature of the demand curve, Moreover, in a modified Mussa-Rosen model in which
consumers have a high-end outside option, Champsaur and Rochet (1989, section 3) show
that the monopolist can optimally overprovide quality. In the next section we explore these
potential explanations for our quality overprovision result.
7 Inside the black box: Explaining quality overprovision
The quality overprovision from the previous section is at odds with the results from the
screening literature described in Section 2, which typically predicts quality degradation for
low consumer types and no distortions at the top. In this section we assess possible expla-
nations for the quality overprovision that we find. One is provided by Spence (1975) where
the marginal valuation of quality increases more for high-willingness-to-pay consumers. An
alternative to this preference-based explanation is one provided by Champsaur and Rochet
(1989), who show that when the monopolist faces competition from a high-end competitor
offering consumers a high-quality outside option (in contrast to the low-quality outside option
assumed in most nonlinear pricing models), then it may optimally choose to distort qualities
upward relative to the first-best. Indeed, in the cable setting, the relevant outside option
is satellite TV, which is reasonable to characterize as a high-end product (as satellite TV
bundles typically offer more channels).
Given that our quality overprovision result goes against conventional wisdom in much
of the nonlinear pricing literature, we also examine its robustness. In this section we report
results from a wide range of simulations to examine the robustness of the quality overprovision
result to changes in key demand model parameters. Specifically, we estimated a negative
correlation (i.e., ρ < 0) between the random coefficients on prices and quality in the demand
model. Since it is well-recognized in the demand estimation literature that the parameters in
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the covariance matrix of random coefficients may be delicately identified36, we perform these
robustness checks to ensure that our quality overprovision result is not just a spurious artifact
arising from the potentially poor identification of these preference parameters.
Since quality overprovision arises primarily in multi-good markets (as shown in Figure 4),
we investigate these concerns in a 2-product system. For our benchmark 2-product system,
we use Evansville, IL in 1997, in which the cable monopolist was Falcon Cable TV.37
Figure 5 presents the results of our simulations for this market. For a wide range of possible
values of the correlation parameter ρ ∈ [−0.9, 0.9] we compute profit maximizing price and
quality levels ppi−maxcj and q
pi−max
cj , respectively. We do this under the situation when the DBS
competitor is present in the market and under the alternative market structure, where there is
no DBS competitor. Then, we calculate socially optimal price and quality levels pSP−maxcj and
qSP−maxcj , for situations with and without competition from satellite providers. With these
quantities we can now illustrate how the degree of under-/over-provision changes for different
values of the correlation parameter and how this relationship is affected by competition.
Figure 5: Benchmark two-product market (Evansville, IL; 1997): profit and TS maximizing
cable quality for monopolist with (left) and without (right) the presence of DBS competitor.
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It is apparent that the over-provision result is present for any value of the correlation
parameter. Interestingly, comparing the two graphs in Figure 5, the presence of a DBS
competitor leads the multi-product cable firm to overprovide quality of both products not
only relative to the social planner, but also relative to the quality levels it would choose if the
DBS competitor were removed. For example, for the high-quality product (qhigh) we see that,
across all values of ρ, the monopolist chooses a quality level roughly 80% higher than what
the social planner chooses when the DBS competitor is present, whereas removing the DBS
competition causes the monopolist to choose lower quality levels identical to that of the social
36For that reason, many applications of random coefficient demand models assume that the random coeffi-
cients are independent, i.e., have a diagonal covariance matrix.
37This market is representative of all 2-product markets in the sense of having smallest Euclidean distance
from simple average of each characteristics across systems with the same number of products.
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planner. The key takeaway here is that the presence of satellite competition leads cable firms
to offer significantly higher quality levels, thus confirming Champsaur and Rochet’s model.
In essence, quality overprovision can be interpreted as a business stealing strategy on the
part of cable companies vis-a-vis their satellite competitors. An important feature of satellite
competition is that satellite companies offer identical products at identical prices across all
geographic markets. Because of this, a profit maximizing monopolist has, relative to the
social planner, an incentive to provide higher quality products similar to those of the satellite
competitor at lower prices without fearing reprisals from the satellite company.38 However,
providing products comparable in quality to high-end satellite products requires a high level
of cost-efficiency; therefore not all cable firms will engage in it; only more cost-efficient ones
will. Our cost estimates, illustrated in Figure 3, show that two- and three-product cable
systems tend to be more cost efficient than one-product providers. Hence, we would expect
a higher preponderance of quality overprovision in multi-product markets, which is precisely
what we find in Figure 4: cable quality is typically over-provided in multi-product markets
but under-provided in single-product markets.39
While we have focused here on quality overprovision in multi-good markets, the theory
in Spence (1975) shows that quality overprovision can also arise in single-good monopoly
markets. We conclude this section by testing Spence’s results. While Figure 4 shows that there
are not many single-product markets in which quality overprovision is present, we consider
one such market – Austin, TX – in which overprovision does occur. Figure 6 is analogous to
Figure 5 above, and shows that, similarly to the previous results, when we take away satellite
competition, then the quality overprovision result essentially disappears.40
To consider whether Spence’s results are relevant here, we use Proposition 1 from Spence
(1975), which states that for a single-product monopolist a sufficient condition for quality
underprovision is that ∂
2P
∂q∂s < 0, i.e., that the cross-partial of the inverse demand function
with respect to quality and quantity is negative. For our demand model, we used the implicit
function theorem to compute this cross-partial derivative for different values of the correlation
coefficient as plotted in Figure 6.
38Indeed, when one of the 11,000 local cable firm changes its policy it is very unlikely that satellite competitors
will respond by changing their national prices and quality levels in response.
39Out of 7,100 one-product market observations we found that cable firms over-provide quality in only about
20%. The over-provision result is much stronger in two- and three- product markets, where quality is inflated
in 85% and 95% of observations, respectively.
40Section A.5 in the Appendix provides similar simulations for four additional markets, which show the
robustness of the conclusions in this section across different values of ρ.
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Figure 6: Single-product market (Austin, TX): profit and TS maximizing cable quality for
monopolist with (left) and without (right) the presence of a DBS competitor. Shaded area
to the left of red line describes the range of parameter values where a profit maximizing firm
would overprovide quality relative to the first best.
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Interestingly, in the absence of DBS competition (the right panel) we see that the value
of ∂P∂q∂s is positive (green dash line) when the monopolist over-provides quality and negative
when the monopolist under-provides quality, which is exactly in line with the Spence model.
In the presence of DBS competition, however, Spence’s proposition no longer holds, and we
see from the left panel that in this case a profit maximizing monopolist would choose to
over-provide quality for a wide range of values of ρ even when the cross-partial is negative.
While the results to this point have discussed specific individual markets, they are robust
across the markets in our sample. Specifically, Figure 7 reports (qs.opt − qpi−max)/qpi−max,
the percentage difference between socially-optimal and profit-maximizing quality levels when
DBS is absent across all the markets in our data.41
The results clearly demonstrate the robustness of our result that quality overprovision
only occurs in the presence of a DBS competitor. We see that for all 1-, 2-, and 3-product
markets, the mass of the histograms are primarily in the positive region, indicating that firms
would engage in quality degradation (ie. setting profit-maximizing qualities lower than socially
optimal) in the absence of DBS competition. This is a dramatic difference compared to the
widespread evidence of quality overprovision in the presence of DBS competition shown in
Figure 4 above.
41Note that both of these are counterfactual qualities, which are simulated from the structural model.
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Figure 7: Quality inflation for each product by type of cable system: socially optimal and
profit maximizing if DBS is out
Quality inflation is defined in percentage terms as the difference between socially optimal and profit maximizing
quality level when DBS is eliminated from the market.
To sum up, our explorations in this section have shown that the quality overprovision which
we have documented in cable TV markets appears to arise from cable companies’ efforts to
compete effectively with a high-end outside option (satellite TV); this is consistent with the
theoretical results in Champsaur and Rochet (1989). Moreover, even in single-good markets,
our results confirm Spence’s (1975) finding that the monopolist can over- or under-provide
quality depending on the curvature of the inverse demand function. These results are robust
across values of the ρ parameter, which suggests that the quality overprovision result is not
merely a function of the estimated correlation in preferences for price and quality, but depends
critically on the presence and nature of competition with high-quality (satellite) competitors.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a model of consumer and producer behavior to measure the dis-
tortions in product quality in imperfectly competitive markets for paid television services.
We estimate demand- and supply-side structural parameters using data from the U.S. local
cable markets in 1997-2006. Via counterfactual simulations, we find that cable companies
set both prices and qualities too high relative to the social optimum: qualities between 23%
and 55% and prices between 33% and 74%. Cable customers are facing overly large bundles
at inflated prices, and would prefer smaller bundles with lower prices. These are important
insights into how consumers trade off price versus quality and may be particularly relevant
to US policymakers concerned about high and rising pay television prices.
Our finding that a monopolist can overprovide quality is novel relative to the existing
empirical literature. Further investigations show that this result is driven by the presence of
a high-end outside option represented by satellite products, thus providing empirical support
for the theoretical results in Champsaur and Rochet (1989).
Our results point the way to several possible extensions. Based on features of the insti-
tutional environment, we take the number of products offered by firms as fixed. We assume
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consumers have preferences over a scalar “quality” variable, and extending our framework
to allow for heterogeneous tastes across multiple different television networks would be use-
ful. Consumer demand in television markets can exhibit dynamic features, such as state
dependence or switching costs, and extending our analysis to examine firms’ quality choices
under richer demand specifications would be fruitful.42 Finally, we focus on the quality (and
price) choices of downstream distributors, taking as given the qualities of upstream television
networks; generalizing the analysis to those firms’ quality choices would also be of interest.
42Shcherbakov (2016) estimates a dynamic demand model for television markets.
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A Additional results
A.1 Additional reduced form evidence of quality inflation
Here we present some additional reduced-form evidence regarding the extent of quality over-
provision by cable monopolists facing satellite competition. Table 8 presents regressions in
which the dependent variable is the quality level for each of the available product tiers. The
key independent variables are dummy variables for years before and after the year in which
the cable system’s DBS competitor begins carrying local channels.
While not all the parameters on these dummy variables are precisely estimated, we find
that statistically significant post-intro coefficients are all positive, which we expect if cable
firms inflate quality when facing a more competitive high-end alternative. Interestingly, in
multi-product markets, the coefficients in the post-intro dummies are larger in magnitude for
higher-quality products, which is consistent with our structural estimates from Section 6.
Table 8: Cable Quality changes around local channels intro by DBS
2
*variables 1-product 2-product 3-product
q q-low q-high q-low q-med. q-high
intro year+2 and after 0.089 0.265*** 0.405*** 0.452*** 0.587*** 0.762***
(0.098) (0.078) (0.089) (0.108) (0.143) (0.160)
intro year+1 0.207** 0.203 0.193 -0.207 -0.348 -0.328
(0.101) (0.156) (0.180) (0.247) (0.326) (0.364)
intro year -0.040 0.138 0.344** 0.263 0.298 0.521*
(0.082) (0.130) (0.150) (0.210) (0.278) (0.310)
intro year-1 0.157** 0.037 0.047 0.185 0.041 -0.044
(0.069) (0.095) (0.110) (0.171) (0.226) (0.252)
intro year-2 0.144*** 0.257** 0.194* -0.300 -0.090 -0.163
(0.056) (0.101) (0.116) (0.242) (0.319) (0.356)
constant 2.481*** 1.351*** 3.405*** 1.930*** 2.961*** 4.868***
(0.029) (0.051) (0.058) (0.114) (0.150) (0.168)
year dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
observations 7,140 3,693 3,693 1,381 1,381 1,381
R-squared 0.191 0.625 0.341 0.157 0.576 0.554
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.2 Surplus and buying probabilities across consumer types
Purchase probabilities We created heatmap graphs for representative 1- and 2-product
markets, discussed in Section 7. Taking satellite TV as the highest quality product, we see
that consumers who have the highest probability of buying satellite (i.e., the yellow blocks in
the right-hand side panel of both Figure 8 and 9 are primarily those with intermediate values
for the quality coefficient. In comparison, consumers with high quality coefficients are most
likely to buy lower quality cable products, as shown in the LH panels in Figure 8 and 9.
Figure 8: Heatmap and surface for probability of buying cable and DBS, 2-product market.
Figure 9: Heatmap and surface for probability of buying cable and DBS, 1-product market.
Consumers surplus To illustrate the type-specific surplus distribution in our multi-dimensional
model we created surface graphs measuring expected consumer surplus in dollar equivalent
as a function of the heterogeneity parameters αip and αiq (price and quality sensitivity, re-
spectively). Figure 10 illustrates consumer surplus distribution for the same 1- and 2-product
markets we used for analysis in Section 7.
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Figure 10: Distribution of consumer surplus in 1- and 2-product markets.
In these figures we see that generally, consumers with high WTP for quality and low price
sensitivity gain the highest consumer surplus (shown as bright yellow in the graphs), while
those with low WTP for quality obtain low consumer surplus, regardless of price sensitivity
(shown as dark blue/purple). The latter result is perhaps not surprising, as consumers with
low WTP for quality purchase the low-end outside option, and obtain low surplus.
A.3 Price elasticity and markups
Figure 11: Histogram for average price elasticities
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Notes: three graphs show, respectively, distributions of weighted own price elasticities across markets
with 1-, 2-, or 3-products.
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Table 9: Summary statistics for weighted average own price elasticity by product type across
markets
variable mean p50 min max sd
1-product mkts -5.15 -4.50 -100.72 -0.43 5.62
2-product mkts -5.26 -4.06 -67.70 -0.45 4.27
3-product mkts -5.28 -4.06 -66.61 -0.70 5.43
Notes: to calculate the statistics for multi-product cable systems we use product-specific market
shares as the weights.
Table 10: Estimated Price Markups
Price Markups
Market Type Obs Mean St.Dev.
One-product markets 7,105 0.264 0.139
Two-product markets
Low-quality products 3,615 0.320 0.202
High-quality products 3,615 0.226 0.100
Three-product markets
Low-quality products 1,327 0.339 0.188
Medium-quality products 1,327 0.174 0.101
High-quality products 1,327 0.210 0.095
Notes: Reported are estimated price markups from our baseline estimation results (Table 5, Column (2)).
Price markups are reported as a percentage of price, (pj − mcj)/pj . Estimated values are averaged across
markets by market type (1, 2, or 3-product markets) and product type within market type.
A.4 Details: Factual and counterfactual price and quality levels
Table 11 provides the full set prices and qualities underlying the results presented in Table 7
in the main text.
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Table 11: Factual and counterfactual levels of price and quality
system variable (po, qo) (ps, qo) (po, qs) (ps, qs)
1-prod.
p-low 22.34 16.81 22.34 17.14
q-low 3.26 3.26 4.70 3.44
2-prod.
p-low 18.08 13.44 18.08 10.91
q-low 3.07 3.07 3.46 1.57
p-high 33.30 26.05 33.30 14.40
q-high 5.25 5.25 5.69 3.54
3-prod.
p-low 18.19 12.85 18.19 10.08
q-low 2.55 2.55 3.35 0.90
p-med. 33.85 28.61 33.85 12.99
q-med. 7.36 7.36 7.66 2.74
p-high 61.00 47.82 61.00 15.29
q-high 9.13 9.13 9.71 3.88
A.5 Additional simulations of quality distortions with and without DBS
competitor
In this section, we have computed the profit-maximizing and social-optimal levels of quality
across different values of the correlation parameter ρ, for several additional markets. They
are shown in Figure 12 below. We computed the figures for two additional 1-product mar-
kets and two-additional 2-product markets. For these markets, we don’t always see quality
overprovision: in obs. 6274 and 7233, for instance, there is always quality degradation, both
when DBS is present or absent. But in both cases, quality degradation is larger when DBS is
absent, which is the direction that we would expect. The other two markets present results
qualitatively similar to those presented in Section 7 of the main text. Despite their slight
differences, the main point of these additional simulations is that the primary conclusions of
the paper are robust across different values of ρ.
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Figure 12: Additional robustness checks on correlation parameter ρ
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B Robustness checks
B.1 Alternative sets of instrumental variables
Table 12 reports parameter estimates for two alternative specifications (both GMM second
stage). The first one is “OLS-type” where price and quality variables were used as own
instruments. In order to identify parameters of consumer heterogeneity we used additional
instruments such as MSO-based average quality and average price for each product.
To obtain estimates for the second specification, “min-IV”, we used a minimal set of instru-
mental variables (only ownership-based instruments were employed). OLS-type specification
results in smaller magnitudes for the price coefficients, similarly to the attenutation bias one
would expect in a linear model. Estimation results from the “min-IV” specification turn out
to be quite similar to the ones reported in the main text.
Table 12: Results for alternative specifications, 1997-2006 (No. obs 12,214).
parameter
OLS-type min-IV
coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
price coefficient, αip
mean -0.553 (0.000) -0.684 (0.011)
income -0.304 (0.027) -0.433 (0.022)
household size 0.190 (0.017) 0.415 (0.054)
urban -0.161 (0.029) -0.184 (0.036)
sigma 0.100 (0.003) 0.119 (0.011)
quality coefficient, αiq
mean 1.105 (0.041) 1.228 (0.092)
income -0.265 (0.265) -0.336 (0.807)
household size 0.459 (0.200) 0.227 (0.387)
urban -0.003 (0.276) 0.334 (0.888)
sigma 0.352 (0.003) 0.268 (0.011)
ρab -0.669 (0.010) -0.451 (0.013)
demand t-dummies Yes Yes
supply t-dummies Yes Yes
Note: full estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
B.2 Alternative measures of quality
We provide comparison of estimation results under our original and two alternative measures
of quality in Table 13 below. In particular, column (1) reproduces the results of our original
specification. Column (2) assigns weight of zero to any free-of-charge channel, i.e., measures
quality as the total cost of nonfree channels in a bundle. Finally, column (3) assigns weight
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of 0.1 to each channel in the bundle.43 As the results indicate, the results are quantitatively
and qualitatively robust across these alternative measures of quality.
Table 13: Robustness checks for alternative measures of quality
parameter
(1) (2) (3)
original nonfree only number of channels
mean -0.673 -0.727 -0.720
(s.e.) (0.008) (0.047) (0.031)
sigma 0.102 0.135 0.128
(s.e.) (0.018) (0.030) (0.033)
quality coefficient, αiq
mean 1.108 1.265 0.881
(s.e.) (0.121) (0.110) (0.180)
sigma 0.310 0.368 0.391
(s.e.) (0.020) (0.087) (0.081)
ρab -0.545 -0.333 -0.351
(s.e.) (0.128) (0.326) (0.313)
demand time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
supply time-dummies Yes Yes Yes
43We chose this weight to obtain levels of quality that are roughly similar to our original measure.
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C Full estimation results
Table 14: Estimation results, 1997-2006 (No. obs 12,214).
parameter
(1) (2)
coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
price coefficient, αip
mean -0.673 (0.008) -0.682 (0.035)
income -0.418 (0.147)
household size 0.396 (0.271)
urban -0.173 (0.177)
sigma 0.102 (0.018) 0.122 (0.018)
quality coefficient, αiq
mean 1.108 (0.121) 1.225 (0.241)
income -0.337 (0.777)
household size 0.221 (1.395)
urban 0.331 (0.917)
sigma 0.310 (0.020) 0.266 (0.048)
corr(aip, aiq) -0.545 (0.128) -0.481 (0.049)
demand cab t-dummies
const 10.313 (0.349) 10.218 (0.479)
y-1998 0.650 (0.259) 0.590 (0.266)
y-1999 2.022 (0.288) 1.879 (0.305)
y-2000 1.961 (0.327) 1.815 (0.346)
y-2001 1.607 (0.366) 1.415 (0.384)
y-2002 -0.294 (0.397) -0.415 (0.671)
y-2003 1.976 (0.473) 2.038 (0.584)
y-2004 2.596 (0.720) 2.631 (0.808)
y-2005 0.243 (1.302) 0.040 (1.369)
y-2006 1.165 (0.704) 1.002 (0.809)
demand sat t-dummies
const 5.994 (0.301) 5.915 (0.418)
y-1998 0.351 (0.057) 0.339 (0.072)
y-1999 1.072 (0.062) 1.062 (0.134)
y-2000 0.016 (0.536) -0.581 (0.629)
y-2001 0.273 (0.496) -0.354 (0.575)
y-2002 2.698 (0.825) 1.773 (0.993)
y-2003 9.980 (0.883) 9.172 (0.979)
y-2004 7.866 (1.047) 6.935 (1.174)
y-2005 7.043 (1.139) 5.690 (1.277)
y-2006 6.364 (1.169) 5.101 (1.342)
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C (cont.) Full estimation results
Table 15: Estimation results, 1997-2006 (No. obs 12,214).
parameter
(1) (2)
coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
supply parameters, c0j
const 1.779 (1.280) 0.960 (1.497)
y-1998 0.017 (0.260) -0.132 (0.303)
y-1999 -0.313 (1.338) -0.049 (0.304)
y-2000 0.051 (0.344) 0.071 (0.223)
y-2001 0.131 (0.361) 0.109 (0.207)
y-2002 -1.952 (3.218) -0.917 (1.991)
y-2003 -0.535 (0.869) -0.575 (0.655)
y-2004 0.078 (0.647) 0.089 (0.566)
y-2005 -0.219 (1.385) -0.158 (1.119)
y-2006 -0.204 (0.809) -0.110 (0.563)
MSO(p0) 0.448 (0.337) 0.568 (0.204)
MSO(p1) -0.696 (0.587) -0.648 (0.254)
MSO(p2) 0.454 (0.629) 0.195 (0.312)
MSO(q0) -0.651 (4.754) 0.245 (4.096)
MSO(q1) 0.717 (2.810) 0.146 (1.248)
MSO(q2) -2.528 (7.490) 0.147 (3.287)
MSO sub. 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
MSO cap. 0.011 (0.030) 0.015 (0.019)
MSO num. prod. -0.304 (0.435) -0.234 (0.504)
Own cap. -0.002 (0.015) 0.000 (0.005)
Own m.coax. -0.031 (0.360) -0.017 (0.216)
supply parameters, c1j
const 0.370 (1.236) 0.523 (0.375)
y-1998 -0.044 (0.248) 0.042 (0.102)
y-1999 0.040 (0.223) 0.011 (0.136)
y-2000 -0.015 (0.231) -0.022 (0.055)
y-2001 -0.041 (0.136) -0.032 (0.052)
y-2002 1.085 (2.282) 0.139 (0.349)
y-2003 0.214 (0.633) 0.103 (0.127)
y-2004 0.100 (0.509) -0.035 (0.105)
y-2005 0.137 (0.923) -0.013 (0.209)
y-2006 0.048 (0.574) -0.055 (0.094)
MSO(p0) 0.098 (0.800) -0.082 (0.046)
MSO(p1) 0.286 (0.213) 0.195 (0.073)
MSO(p2) -0.212 (0.341) -0.026 (0.080)
MSO(q0) -1.339 (9.408) -0.429 (1.017)
MSO(q1) -0.365 (1.454) 0.049 (0.326)
MSO(q2) 1.674 (2.824) 0.016 (0.765)
MSO sub. -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
MSO cap. -0.003 (0.013) -0.003 (0.004)
MSO num. prod. -0.059 (0.383) 0.006 (0.092)
Own cap. 0.000 (0.012) -0.001 (0.001)
Own m.coax. 0.017 (0.253) -0.001 (0.032)
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D First stage regressions
VARIABLES pc0 pc1 pc2 qc0 qc1 qc2
MSO-p0 1.713*** 1.491*** 1.692*** -0.905*** 0.322*** 0.610***
(0.151) (0.194) (0.317) (0.0329) (0.0357) (0.0478)
MSO-p1 -4.642*** 17.87*** -9.870*** -1.000*** 1.870*** -1.711***
(0.156) (0.201) (0.327) (0.0339) (0.0369) (0.0493)
MSO-p2 2.623*** 0.515** 20.49*** 0.0896** -0.312*** 2.268***
(0.201) (0.258) (0.421) (0.0437) (0.0475) (0.0634)
MSO-q0 25.06*** -68.72*** -10.98* 11.72*** -11.61*** -6.745***
(2.749) (3.531) (5.757) (0.597) (0.649) (0.867)
MSO-q1 11.50*** -17.67*** -10.69*** 2.259*** -3.172*** -2.113***
(1.000) (1.285) (2.095) (0.217) (0.236) (0.316)
MSO-q2 -6.523*** 2.201 -44.70*** -0.410* 1.447*** -5.210***
(1.130) (1.452) (2.367) (0.245) (0.267) (0.357)
MSO-N.subs -0.000122*** 0.000108*** 0.000309*** -2.19e-05*** 6.82e-05*** 8.61e-05***
(1.66e-05) (2.14e-05) (3.48e-05) (3.61e-06) (3.93e-06) (5.25e-06)
MSO-Capac. 0.182*** 0.135*** -0.135*** 0.0328*** 0.0128*** -0.0166***
(0.00914) (0.0117) (0.0191) (0.00198) (0.00216) (0.00288)
MSO-#prod. -3.177*** 0.339 19.56*** -0.523*** 0.984*** 2.556***
(0.298) (0.383) (0.624) (0.0647) (0.0703) (0.0940)
Own Capac. 0.00801** 0.0574*** 0.163*** 0.00560*** 0.0244*** 0.0249***
(0.00378) (0.00486) (0.00792) (0.000821) (0.000893) (0.00119)
Own cable len. -0.648*** 1.382*** 5.129*** -0.192*** 0.481*** 0.735***
(0.116) (0.149) (0.242) (0.0251) (0.0273) (0.0365)
Constant 8.887*** 4.650*** -21.70*** 0.916*** -0.720*** -2.677***
(0.856) (1.100) (1.792) (0.186) (0.202) (0.270)
t=1998 -0.260 0.810*** 0.841** -0.00559 0.341*** 0.247***
(0.203) (0.261) (0.425) (0.0441) (0.0479) (0.0640)
t=1999 1.450*** 1.272*** 0.911** 0.341*** 0.638*** 0.362***
(0.212) (0.273) (0.445) (0.0461) (0.0501) (0.0670)
t=2000 0.955*** 3.000*** 1.440*** 0.259*** 0.912*** 0.447***
(0.243) (0.312) (0.508) (0.0527) (0.0573) (0.0766)
t=2001 1.025*** 3.404*** 2.314*** 0.221*** 0.997*** 0.549***
(0.257) (0.331) (0.539) (0.0558) (0.0607) (0.0812)
t=2002 -1.545*** 3.663*** 0.0802 0.265*** 1.128*** 0.391***
(0.302) (0.388) (0.632) (0.0655) (0.0712) (0.0952)
t=2003 7.517*** 16.30*** -0.463 2.091*** 2.932*** 1.067***
(0.361) (0.464) (0.756) (0.0783) (0.0852) (0.114)
t=2004 9.301*** 20.47*** 1.059 2.230*** 4.144*** 2.339***
(0.460) (0.591) (0.963) (0.0999) (0.109) (0.145)
t=2005 6.693*** 13.71*** 9.768*** 1.805*** 3.154*** 3.248***
(0.766) (0.984) (1.604) (0.166) (0.181) (0.242)
t=2006 8.257*** 18.60*** -1.830** 2.779*** 4.228*** 1.781***
(0.413) (0.531) (0.865) (0.0897) (0.0975) (0.130)
Observations 12,214 12,214 12,214 12,214 12,214 12,214
R-squared 0.260 0.792 0.550 0.365 0.776 0.553
F val 214.3 2326 745.2 350.6 2115 755.6
F test 0 0 0 0 0 0
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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